Some Background
We are many things, one of which is, we are believers. We are also sons or daughters, philosophers, and physical objects, to name a few others. And we all want to do well.
We know what it is to do well as, let us say, a son. When Some philosophers, at least when judging from first appearances, say they do. 'To believe a proposition is to accept it with the aim of thereby accepting a truth', says David Velleman (2000: 251) . According to Nishi Shah (2003: 470) , '…to say that it is a conceptual rather than [as in Velleman' s view] a metaphysical matter that truth is the standard for correctness of belief is to say that a competent user of the concept of belief must accept the prescription to believe that p only if p is true for any activity that he conceives as belief-formation '. 1 No one will deny that a belief is correct if true. What one can deny, however, is that correctness is by itself normatively significant. Let me explain. I am a wearer of shoes.
It might well be a conceptual truth that the right place for the right shoe is the right foot. If I wear the right shoe on the left foot I wear it incorrectly. Sometimes this might well be a good idea. Suppose the kids love it and the inconvenience is negligible. If, as usual, I wear my shoes correctly, I do so not because it is the correct way to wear them. I do it because I want to look normal, walk comfortably and so on.
There are standards of correctness, which are essential to some activity, which we do not or cannot escape from. None of this, however, can establish the normative significance of these standards of correctness. Are there other ways to bind ourselves to aiming at truth? When thinking about how I might do well as a believer, one plausible suggestion might be that I want to have beliefs that are helpful to me and to others. If, for example, you ask for the right way, and I want to help you, I need to know what the right way is. At least I need a true belief about it. A true belief about the right way is important because it is important to take the right way. If, however, I am set on taking a wrong way (due to, for example, ignorance or weakness of will) it will be bad for me to have a true belief about how best to pursue what, as a matter of fact, is wrong.
3 Why, then, should I be concerned about truth?
The answer, in my view, is that we want to act well. In acting we are guided by our conception of the situation we face in which we act. We can only act well if our picture of this situation is accurate. Truth is important because we need truth in order to be able to act well. Above I switched freely between the bi-conditional formulation and its parts. The biconditional entails the Part 1 conditional. However, we deal here with propositions in the context of being desired. Thus, we ought to be cautious. I certainly do not want to claim that desire or rational desire is closed under obvious entailment. In its generality, such a view would be implausible (see Ross 1941) . If I want a letter to be mailed, then, if rational desire were closed under obvious entailment, I would also want any disjunctive expansion of the thing I want. For example, I would also want that the letter be mailed or that it be burnt. Anything would then satisfy a desire of mineeven burning the letter, I wanted to be mailed. Ross's observation explains why another move would also be illegitimate. We cannot, in general, move from a desire for a conjunction A&B to a desire for one of its conjuncts. Again, we would have weakened the content of our desire. Complementary goods -such as a cigarette and a lighter, a car and a tank of petrol -illustrate the illegitimacy of such a move.
We ought to be cautious when using logical manipulations within a desire context. At this point, however, we are safe. Our interest in truth, James has said, has two parts.
The bi-conditional formulation simply puts these two parts together.
Many philosophers endorse the bi-conditional formulation of our interest in truth.
Paul Horwich (2006: 347) Thus, I hope John will get it.
In cases like these, the transition from a desire for a conditional and noticing the truth of its antecedent to a desire for the consequent looks rationally mandatory. Ross's point does not affect it. This transition does not involve a weakening of the desired proposition we start with, quite the contrary. Arguably, it moves from a disjunctive desire to a desire for one of the disjuncts, via realizing that the other disjunct does not obtain. This is certainly plausible. I want to marry Sue or Lou. Sue is married to someone else, I hear. So, I want to marry Lou.
In anticipation of a criticism, I want to weaken the transition rule. I might want that
John gets the post, after Jim has been eliminated, because he is the second most deserving candidate. In terms of the candidate's merit, I rank Jim over John and John over all the others. Thus, in terms of merit, I want that if Jim does not get the post, John should get it. Thereby, I have qualified my desire. It is desire based on only one group of concerns. I will allow desire talk, even if by saying one desires something one only means that one desires something in respect to a certain group of concerns.
In this example, the area of interest is fairness -appointing in accordance to merit.
Although, in terms of fairness I want John to get the job, if Jim does not get it, fairness need not be my sole concern or what is most important to me in these matters.
Suppose I do not want anyone new in the department (for whatever reasons), and that this desire to leave things unchanged is stronger than my desire to appoint by merit.
Thus, what I overall want (or want in an unqualified sense) is that no one gets the job.
Overall, I also want that if Jim does not get the job, no one else should get it.
Nevertheless, in terms of fairness, I want that if Jim does not get the job John should.
Fairness is important to me so I will have to agree that Jim's not getting the job is a 
Point 1
Believing that something bad is going to happen to me is no reason to want it to happen.
What Part 2 says is that we want if we believe that p, then p. Suppose we know that we believe that p. Then, by the transition rule introduced above, we seem to be committed to wanting that p. At least, believing that p would be, given what is taken to be an aspect of being interested in truth, a reason for wanting p. This is implausible.
Suppose p is something bad. Does the fact that I believe something bad will happen to me, give me any reason at all to want it to happen? It seems not.
Generalizing Point 1
The expected bad is not made any better by having been expected. The unexpected good is not made any less good by having been unexpected.
The expected (or unexpected) indifferent remains indifferent.
Whether I want p to obtain depends on my evaluation of p. If p is something good, then I want it, if it is bad, I do not want it, and if I care neither way, I will be indifferent towards p. Whether I believe that p will occur does not make any difference to my evaluation of p -at least if things are, as they normally are. Here is an example. I like sunny weather; I do not like rain. The forecast, which I know is reliable, predicts rain and so I believe it will rain tomorrow. What do we learn from this preference order? The first thing we learn is that you prefer being healthy to being ill. Being healthy is being in state S1 or in S2, being ill is being in state S3 or in S4. S1 or S2 is preferred to S3 or S4.
The second thing we learn is that you are interested in truth. (rightly believing that you are ill).
We might describe the lesson of this example as follows. For every mismatch between beliefs and the world, there is a match that is preferred. This shows that you are interested in truth. What is not true, however, is that every match is preferred to every mismatch. This shows that you are not interested in being right.
In my view, this example shows that the Standard View is incorrect. Part 2 of the Standard View is simply not part of a concern for truth as we understand it. It is not a concern characteristic of a seeker and lover of truth; it rather is the concern of a person we call the dogmatist. A concern for truth requires a certain kind of openness towards the world. Let me believe whatever it is that is true. Part 2, however, contains a rather different demand. Whatever I believe let it happen! Let me be right. 4. An Objection Rejected
People in the grip of Part 2 might object to my way of seeing things as follows. It is true that the preference of S2 over S3 shows a violation of the Part 2 concern. This violation occurs because, quite reasonable, health is considered to be more important than satisfying the Part-2 concern. The fact that a concern can be outweighed, however, does not show that one does not have it. In fact, it is quite plausible to say that, in a qualified sense, one prefers S3 to S2. Epistemically speaking, S3 is better than S2. Thus, the example does nothing to undermine the idea that Part 2 is an essential aspect of our interest in truth.
There is something right about this objection and there is something wrong about it. I agree, epistemically speaking, S3 is preferable to S2. However -and here the objection goes wrong -this does not show that we accept Part 2 of the Standard View.
S3 is preferable to S2 because S3 satisfies Part 1 of the interest in truth, whereas S2
does not satisfy Part 1. There is something good about S2 -you are healthy -and there is something bad about S2 -you have missed a truth. There is something good about S3 -you have captured a truth -and there is something bad about S3 -you are ill. Because you prefer S2 to S3 you would trade off one good -having captured a truth -for another -being healthy. We do not appeal to Part 2 to explain these facts.
Thus, it is incorrect to assume that the fact that S2 is better than S3 shows that we have (an outweighed) Part-2 concern.
Suppose you prefer S4 to S3. S3 contains one good -you believe something true. S4
contains no good. Why would you then prefer S4 to S3? You will have this preference if health and truth are not your only concerns. A further concern will come into play.
Believing something positive about yourself is itself a good to you, independently of whether the positive thing actually occurs or not. Now beliefs offer different goods.
One good is to believe truly; the other is to believe pleasantly. If one trades off the good of truth for the good of pleasure (or, rather, for the good of lack of anxiety), then one has, intuitively, abandoned one's concern for truth.
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Compare this trade-off -a trade-off between goods believing can bring -with the trade-off between health and truth. Someone who is willing to make the latter tradeoff thinks that there are greater goods than that which can come from believing.
Insofar as believing is concerned, such a person might well want the truth and nothing but the truth. 13 This is, in my view, the only reasonable form our interest in truth can take. Believing truly is then most important when it comes to the goods believing can bring. The goods of believing, however, are not all the goods there are. Health is more important than a true belief about one's health. It would be absurd to suppose that it is part of our understanding of being interested in truth that it excluded or trumped all other worldly concerns. Only a fool or a whole-hearted dogmatist would have such a structure of concerns. Only a fool would want, when comparing the goods of believing to all the other goods, the truth and nothing but the truth. reasons aside, no one should want things to turn out a certain way simply because he or she believes that this is the way they are going to turn out.
I have argued for the view that Part 1 captures an essential aspect of our concern for truth. Part 2, however, captures a different concern. Special circumstances have to be put in place in order to make a Part 2 concern legitimate. In any case, it is not part of a concern for truth. I have expressed this point by talking about different forms of openness. Being concerned for truth is being open to the world. Let me believe whatever it is that the world might throw at me. It is a concern for my beliefs which is specified by how the world is. Such a concern is of the form 'If the world is such and such, let me be such and such'. We express this concern by means of world-mind conditionals. Part 2, however, is a concern about the world, which is specified by reference to my beliefs. Let the world be such that it proves me right. Such a concern is of the form 'If I am such and such, let the world be such and such'. We express this concern by means of a mind-world conditional. 14 Being interested in truth, is a selfcentred concern. I want to be a certain way, namely responsive to the world. Whereas the relation between the world and truth is symmetric -'p' is true if and only if pour concern for truth is a concern about us and not about the world. That is, if such and such is the case, I want to believe that it is, and if I believe that it is, I want it to be the case. I can put this by saying that I want my beliefs and reality to be disposed in a certain way -I want my beliefs to track reality, to 'accord with how the world actually is' -which is to say I want them to be true."
Nobody likes to be wrong? I am pessimistic about the chances for peace in the Middle
East. Everyone who shares my worries would, like me, want to be proven wrong.
Lynch tells us that he does not want to be a brain in a vat. The reason for his dislike, however, is not that he believes that he is not a brain in the vat and that he cannot stand to get things wrong. That would be a rather shallow reason. Lynch, in contrast to Field, actually uses mind-world conditionals, he accepts the transition rule I have argued for and he endorses desiring the detached consequent. If I believe that the world is such and such, he says, then, because of my interest in truth, I want it to be such and such. Despite the absurdity being right on the surface, it still went unnoticed.
6. Rejecting Part 2 Creates a Problem: How Can We Accommodate James's Insight?
Part 1 says that we want to believe all the truths (or, after appropriate qualification, it says that we want to believe all the truths we are interested in). Part 2 says that we want to believe no falsehood. I have argued that Part 2 is not part of our interest in truth. Have I said that, sometimes, it is quite okay, even epistemically speaking, to accept a falsehood?
Take the following case, a person believes that p, but not-p obtains. If this is all we say about this case, then the agent has missed a truth, the truth of not-p obtaining and, thus, has failed to achieve his Part 1 desire for truth. Part 1 is sufficient to explain that this person did not do well. So, why did we think we needed Part 2 in the first place?
Suppose that not-p obtains, a person believes that p but, furthermore, believes that not-p as well. This person has not missed a truth. Part 1 provides us with no handle to criticize this person in terms of having failed to fulfil his interest in truth, as far as we have explained this interest. Therefore, our explanation is incomplete. We need to add something to Part 1 in order to show why an agent who believes obviously inconsistent things has not satisfied what we would call his or her interest in truth.
We have come some way already. We know that Part 1 is an important part of our interest in truth. Now we need to exclude contradictory beliefs. So let us just do this A desire for truth is, I have argued, I desire to be a certain way. It focuses on how we and our minds work. It is not a desire about what the world is like. We do not demand of the world to match whatever we believe. We demand of us to catch whatever the world is like. Therefore, our interest in truth can only be captured by world-mind conditionals and not be mind-world conditionals. Stalnaker's account serves our purposes ideally because contraposition is not a valid rule for his conditional. The fact that the closest A-world is also a B-world, does not entail that the closest not-B world is also a not-A world. Being interested in truth means to want that one believes p if p occurs (for all interesting propositions p). One wants that the closest p-world is a world in which one believes that p. One also has the Part 2* desire, i.e. one wants not to hold contradictory beliefs. What is not included in our interest in truth is a desire that the closest Bp-world is a p-world.
Often we have no reason to want this and even if we do, it is not well described as an interest in truth, it is rather a case of wanting to be right. 19 
Considering Other Proposals
In the reminder of this paper, I want to consider the views of two philosophers whose views on these matters relate, in different ways, to the view I have presented here.
Chisholm, I want to show, endorses my view. Sosa discusses the problem which led me to abandon Part 2 as an aspect of our interest in truth. He, however, does not draw the same lesson as I have drawn.
In his Theory of Knowledge, Chisholm (1977: 15) endorses James's Insight. "Each person, then, is subject to two quite different requirements in connection with any proposition he considers: (1) he should try his best to bring it about that if a proposition is true then he believe it; and (2) he should try his best to bring it about that if that proposition is false then he not believe it."
Chisholm's way of understanding our interest in truth has the following two parts. Again, to be motivated by the truth on a question is to be motivated to believe the correct answer; let the chips fall where they may."
Let us note this down. The interest in truth is given by two world-mind conditionals.
Part 1 DES (p→Bp) S-Part 2 DES (not-p→Bnot-p)
One might wonder whether S-Part 2 adds anything to Part 1. As these desires hold for all (interesting) propositions p, it does not seem to matter whether we deal with negated or unnegated propositions. (Interest in whether p brings with it an interest in whether not-p.)
Consider someone who wants to believe that p regardless of whether p is the case. If p is the case, the person wants to believe that p. Thus, this person has a Part-1 concern.
If not-p is the case, the person also wants to believe that p. This person is not interested in truth because she lacks the interest described in S-Part 2.
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There are two problems with this account. First, Sosa has a twofold account of our interest in truth. Nevertheless, his account fails to preserve James's Insight. An inconsistent believer might well satisfy both parts of Sosa's account. Someone who believes everything will miss neither a negated nor an unnegated truth. Secondly, Sosa takes the conditionals involved to be material implications. If that were so, they
would not be robust world-mind conditionals and our problem with Part 2 of the biconditional formulation would also affect Sosa's account.
22 Sosa (2002: 50) addresses this problem. "If we believe that a dear friend is terminally ill we would not want our belief to be true. What we want, therefore, is not the truth of the beliefs we do have. We want rather that we would believe <p> only if <p> were true. And from this it does not follow that we want to believe <p>, nor does it follow that we want <p>. Neither of these follow even on the assumption that we do believe <p> and that it is true that p. What we desire is only that our beliefs are safe; for any given proposition, other things equal we would generally desire this: that we believe it only if it were true. Desire neither for the antecedent nor for the consequent is logically entailed by our desire for the conditional. Our general antecedent desire is only for the safety of our beliefs, whatever they may be."
According to Sosa, See Velleman (1996: 184-188) , where he argues that belief will still be regulated by a teleological mechanism with the truth aim, and that a person's lack of interest in truth is a second-order interest relating to the truth-regulated mechanism.
2 This, by no means, is meant to decide issues about the normative status of the aim of having true beliefs. I only want to say that the existence of correctness conditions does not by itself decide the normative issue. The same point is made in Shah (2003: 458) and Wedgwood (2002: 268f.) is also sensitive to this issue.
3 Compare Moore's (1907/08, 173) example of the slow watch, which makes a man miss a train. This turns out to be a good thing, as the train will be involved in an accident. Given that we already have got something wrong -the train will make it safely to its destination -further mistakes might prove useful.
(And who could think of himself as never getting anything wrong?) Weakness of will, by contrast,
shows that true beliefs might be harmful even under conditions of full information. 4 On this picture of action, we do not act well when we achieve our (worthwhile) ends by luck. Brentano says that those things are good, which are loved with a love that we experience as being correct. Considering the love of truth and the hatred of error, we are, he says, immediately aware of the correctness of these attitudes. I mention Plato, Aristotle and Brentano to point to a stronger anchoring of our interest in truth. Its acceptability, however, depends on the credentials of the general philosophical views from which it springs. Heal's position is all I need to endorse to explain my project.
Truth is important to us. What is it, then, that we care about?
6 James (1907, 17) does not speak of our interest but of our duty to pursue truth. This difference will not matter for the concerns of this paper.
7 Depending on where we put the universal quantifier, we get different conceptions of our interest in truth. If the universal quantifier is inside the desire operator, we have one desire to believe all truths. If it is outside we have a desire for each proposition to believe it if it is true. The relevance of this distinction is explored in David (2002) , but will not affect our discussion.
